Whether the pre-11 September 2001 view of terrorism will be forever laid aside, will be reinvigorated in the future or will be once again embraced, remains to be seen. However, what appears clear, is that while this country is "muddling through" the policy questions of how it should respond to terrorism, it is expanding the military's role in counter terrorism as never before seen.
This paper reviews the United States' recent position on terrorists. What are terrorists, are they soldiers, common criminals or criminals against humanity? Second, the paper reviews how 11 September 2001 changed views in the United States and the world--"war" is once again seen as conflict between a state and a non-state, thus moving away from the Westphalian notion of war. Terrorists are now the responsibility of not just law enforcement agencies but also the military. Finally the paper reviews the various mechanisms advanced to try captured terrorists.
BEFORE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 TERRORISTS WERE CRIMINALS
For the last twenty some years the United States has determined that terrorists were criminals. The country assigned responsibility to the domestic law enforcement agencies for counter terrorism occurring within the United States. The country assigned responsibility to the State Department for counter terrorism occurring outside the United States, and that responsibility appears to have been primarily limited to seeking extradition of terrorists to the United States for trial.
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) approved the lead agency concept for United
States counter terrorism responsibility. President Clinton, continuing the policy set by President Secretary Albright did mention the employment of military force against terrorists, but clearly the military option was of last resort. The preferred method of dealing with terrorism was through law enforcement. Given that terrorism is a crime, such a response is expected.
WAR DECLARED AGAINST TERRORISTS
From 1648 until recent times, war has been increasingly the sole province of the nations.
Dating from the mid 1800s and continuing through today, various international agreements have been reached that do their utmost to distinguish war from crime. In particular, only uniformed soldiers, openly bearing arms and subject to the control of their commander, and fighting for a state, were authorized to engage in war. Civilians were not to engage in war, but in turn, were to be left alone by the combatants. World War II started the breakdown of the distinction between soldiers and noncombatants. The imprecision of strategic bombing by both sides killed non-combatants by the thousands, and many felt that they (the non-combatants) were the targets of strategic bombing. Additionally, during World War II noncombatants in occupied countries, the partisans, clandestinely at times-took up arms against the military after their governments had surrendered. Indeed the Germans regarded those partisans who attacked the soldiers as murderers because they weren't carrying arms openly or wearing distinctive uniforms or symbols.
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WAGING WAR TODAY
However, the nature of war is changing. "The art of using battles in order to achieve the objectives of the war presumes that the two sides have considerable armed forces and that those forces are distinguishable from each other, separated by geography, and at least potentially mobile." 9 However, these non-state combatants are becoming the new warriors. "In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal title to describe themselves." 10 Indeed, today much of the controversy over international terrorism agreements is the position many countries take that the terrorist is a freedom fighter-a soldier that ought to receive protection under International Law.
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Nevertheless there are those scholars who continue to insist that we aren't at war with the terrorists. Jordan Paust seemingly bows down to the "definitional god" for his answer, blinding him to what is actually occurring in the real world.
Under international law, we could not be at "war" with an entity that has a status less than that of an insurgent . . . . If we are fighting insurgents, we would be at "war" in at least one sense-regarding application of certain laws of war. We would clearly be at "war" if we are fighting a "belligerent" (which must have outside recognition as an entity with such a status, as in the case of the U.S. Civil War upon recognition of the Confederate States of America as a "belligerent" by Great Britain), and all of the laws of war would apply to such an armed conflict. We could also be at war with a state (e.g., Iraq) or nation (e.g., a group of people recognizably having such a status even though they have no territorial base and there is no recognition or relevant statehood status, as in the case of certain U.S.-Indian wars in the 18 th or 19 th centuries). We could not be at "war" with Osama bin Laden, since he and his entourage are in no way representatives or leaders, et. al., of an "insurgency" within the meaning of international law. He is also not a recognized leader of a "nation," "belligerent," or "state".
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John Cerone responded to Paust in a less dogmatic manner, but perhaps more interesting manner. Cerone acknowledges that the attacks present novel legal issues to be grappled with.
While acknowledging that the law of war, especially as codified in the Geneva Convention of 1949, focuses upon interstate-armed conflict, he points out that the convention itself doesn't define "armed conflict". Then Cerone explains that the United States considers itself to have been the victim of an act of war. Second, NATO invoked Article 5 of its Charter which reiterates the "war" categorization. Third, the UN Security Council in Resolution 1368 and 1373 "recognized the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the charter." It is doubtful that any Security Council Resolution could have been adopted recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against "ordinary criminals."
13 Where Cerone faltered was his argument that "ultimately, to determine whether a state of armed conflict has arisen, it may well be necessary to wait and see if the US responds with armed force." The United States quickly acted in a military manner.
SEPTEMBER 2001 AS A TURNING POINT
History changed on 11 September 2001. The largely unheeded warnings such as:
It is no longer a matter of if-but rather when-a weapon of mass destruction will be used against the people and institutions of the United States.
[A] fundamental shift in U.S. strategy has become necessary; It will have to be a priority mission of the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop, deploy, and operate a wide range of defensive measures for the protection of the U.S. homeland. Today DOD is not prepared for this mission. It is as if its planning and preparations for armed conflict implicitly assumes that U.S. territory would remain a sanctuary. "Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done."
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In this speech, President Bush straddled the crime-war response. He called upon the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to "deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land" presumably for prosecution as criminals. However, President Bush leaned mostly upon the "war" leg.
On September the 11 th , enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command-every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war-to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network 17 .
Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 ."
This declaration will stand as the first call to war against a non-state in our history. 
DEALING WITH TERROISTS IN CUSTODY
The world has changed-now that the western world has accepted a non-Clausewitzian concept of war, namely one fought not between states but between states and non-state entity(ies). Such acknowledgement will be vital in conceptualizing a strategy for the United These trials reviewed actions that allegedly constituted crimes against humanity. Whether some of the terrorists will be treated as POWs or whether they will be treated as war criminals is yet to be seen. However, just as in the World War II, it is foreseeable that not all the terrorists and their supporters will be tried as criminals against humanity, just as not all Nazis were tried in Nuremberg after World War II as war criminals.
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On the other hand, should this country revert to its pre- 11 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST USING CRIMINAL COURTS
Unanimous Verdict.
The civilian jury court system requires that all 12 jurors unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt upon a guilty finding for each defendant, for each indictment. Clearly the civilian jury court system is designed to err on the side of the defendant-to let the defendant go free, or at the least, for the jury to agree upon a lesser crime, rather than possibly convicting an innocent person.
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Outside pressure on juries.
Whether terrorists brought to a jury trial in the United States could ever receive a fair jury trial is questionable. First, the presiding judge would have to ensure that the jury members were not predisposed toward guilt or innocence based upon pre-trial publicity. Second, the jurors may feel compelled to convict the alleged terrorists regardless of the evidence. The juror's identities would be known in the community-one wonders if the jurors could ever face their friends and neighbors with the knowledge that the terrorists were allowed to go free. In the Oklahoma City bombing trial the presiding judge stated, "There is so great a prejudice against these two defendants in the State of Oklahoma that they cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial."
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The notoriety of the11 September 2001 attacks cause one to wonder where in the United
States could a jury be impaneled to impartially sit in judgment.
Intimidation.
If a jury was impaneled, it could face intimidation from the terrorists. During the first World
Trade Center bombing trial, the defendants (terrorists) subjected the jurors to threatening gestures. Would not jurors sitting in judgment of Al Qaeda terrorists justly fear retribution from other terrorists? Would it even be fair to subject civilian jurors and their families to such possible retribution? Furthermore, could a civilian juror appropriately focus upon the evidence with these disconcerting concerns churning in the back of their minds?
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Rules of Evidence.
The Rules of Evidence in civilian criminal trials is designed for the jury to only hear and consider the best quality evidence. For example, hearsay evidence is typically excluded from the juror's ears because of the fear that a juror would not be able to properly adjudge the quality of that evidence and give it due weight in deliberation. Criminal courts routinely prohibit the admission of evidence that was obtained in violation of Miranda warnings, or that was obtained during an illegal search or coerced confession.
Although it is questionable whether these protections were intended to shelter those conducting a war against the Untied States, the courts would most likely continue to apply these exclusionary rules. The courts would look at the terrorists as defendants.
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Ironically, the defendants in World Trade Center bombing trial were earlier targeted by cruise missiles in August 1998. However, once caught and brought before the criminal courts, they benefited from the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial: counsel, right against selfincrimination, call witnesses, cross examine witnesses, exclude evidence that violated their constitutional rights and have a jury determine their guilt or innocence, as defendants, not as soldiers or spies.
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Lessons learned.
Another danger in a public trial is that it could easily reveal information to the terrorists that was best kept confidential. A trial in the civilian courts would expose confidential informants' identity, and therefore making the recruitment of future confidential informants problematical.
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Much of the evidence presumably used at such a trial would be highly classified. If that classified evidence was presented in court, then other terrorists sitting in court would have access to it, or if produced during a closed hearing then the terrorist-defendants could pass their newfound intelligence along to fellow terrorists. 36 Furthermore, because of "chain of custody" rules, it is likely that undercover operatives of this country or friendly countries would be required to testify to prove the "chain of custody" of physical evidence for its admissibility in court. 37 The terrorists could easily use the trial as an "intelligence coup" using such information to refine their skills at covering their tracks as well as being able to root out the intelligence agents and the informants in their midst.
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Platform.
Another fear is that a public trial would provide an unprecedented opportunity for the terrorists to promulgate their views to the world public and recruit followers for their jihad. 
ARGUMENTS FOR USING CRIMINAL COURTS
Existing Court System. An international court would probably not be able to impose the death penalty. Many countries refuse to extradite suspects to countries that may impose the death penalty, or the requesting country must provide assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed, in order to get the suspect extradited. countries, including our European allies, would be unlikely to support the notion of conspiracy to commit murder as being a capital crime.
Conducting a trial of the terrorists in the United
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John Keegan has summed it up nicely. "To any practical person, the proposal is wholly untenable. Even within a single jurisdiction, the prevarication and procrastination of the law are notorious. To transfer the opportunities for those delays and disagreements to a multinational body would be to ensure that no wrongdoer was ever convicted or, if convicted, ever punished." It is unlikely that any International Court established would have the authority to impose death penalties. For example, the United Kingdom only will extradite a criminal to a country that has the power to impose a death penalty when they, the United Kingdom, receive assurances from the requesting country that it will not seek the death penalty.
64 If the United States' staunchest ally in the war takes this position, the probability of getting the United Nations or even NATO to grant death penalty authority to an international court appear remote. It is probable that neither the United States government nor the majority of United States citizens would be satisfied with a court that does not even have the power to impose a death penalty.
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MILITARY COMMISSION.
On 13 The President's order ended weeks of speculation in the press over which method of adjudication the nation would follow, however, it did not end the debate regarding which method was optimal. 
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The court developed exclusionary rule also may be inapplicable. That rule excludes evidence from being used against an accused in court if law enforcement personnel violated a suspect's constitutional rights in obtaining evidence. The exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter police from being over-zealous in their pursuit of criminal suspects. 73 As we are in an armed conflict with combatants-not defendants, the basis for such a rule has been seen as nonapplicable. As appeared in the Wall Street Journal: "Do we really want to give people bent on destroying the U.S. the right to throw out evidence based on the exclusionary rule?"
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ARGUMENTS FOR USING MILITARY COMMISSIONS
Protection of Civilian Courts.
Presidential Counsel Gonzales argues use of military commissions will protect civilian judges, juries, prosecutors and the media from terrorist reprisals. Furthermore, protection of the terrorist defendants would be an immense task, to say noting of the difficulties each day in transporting the defendants from jail to court and back again along public roads.
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Disciplined Panel members.
Military members and military commissions have a history of being able to be evenhanded in evaluating evidence and finding alleged war criminals "not guilty". 76 Indeed many, if not all of the members selected to sit as members of the military commission will have had experience as either courts marital convening authorities or as previous courts marital members, or both. Douglas Kmiec even argues in the Wall Street Journal that the terrorists would have a much fairer trial before a military commission than before a civilian jury.
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Unanimous Findings not Required.
The military commission need only have two-thirds of the members concur for a guilty finding and for sentencing. 78 Civilian criminal courts require a unanimous finding of guilt. 79 It almost goes without saying that not needing a unanimous finding will ease the prosecutor's burden.
Standard of Proof.
The Secretary of Defense has been tasked by the President to establish rules and procedures for the military commission. It is unknown at this time whether "beyond a reasonable doubt", "clear and convincing evidence" or "preponderance of the evidence" will be chosen as the standard of proof applied in the military commissions.
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE USE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS.
Secondary Effects.
"What I fear is that the rest of the world will look at it and say these military courts are not courts of justice but courts of vengeance. The trials will be a formality preceding execution." writes: "There is no absolute guarantee that we could pull off a successful trial-if success is defined as not only fair but perceived to be fair. But by taking the case out of our courts and placing it before a military tribunal, President Bush has conceded failure without even trying. He has shown no faith in the ability of our well-tested legal system to endure the most daunting of challenges."
85
Terrorists as Combatants.
Trying the terrorists before a military commission may advance the terrorists' claim to be soldiers. The terrorists may obtain a symbolic victory in just being brought before a military commission. Regardless that the Untied States will argue that the terrorists are "nonprivileged combatants" or "unlawful combatants"-they are being prosecuted by the military and that gives them the connotations of being soldiers-combatants. The United States may argue in vain before the Islamic world that they are merely criminals, but actions will speak louder than words.
"The trials will thus dignify the terrorists as soldiers in Islam's war against America. This is exactly the wrong message to send."
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CONCLUSION
The terrorists' attacks on 11 September 2001 mark a pivotal point in how the United
States defines and responds to terrorists' acts and terrorism. Before 11 September 2001, the United States defined terrorists as criminals. Because of that definition and viewpoint, law enforcement agencies were assigned the tasks of capturing terrorists and the courts were assigned the task of trying them. Those found guilty were jailed, and those found not guilty were released.
The magnitude of the 11 September 2001 attacks clearly lead the President to acknowledge that a law enforcement response was inadequate. The President declared war upon the terrorists, but in so doing he did not completely abandon the criminal nomenclature.
Rather, after a fashion, the terrorists were seen not so much as criminals but as war criminals, namely those who commit crimes against humanity.
The practical question became, "what to do with those captured terrorists?" If they were common criminals, the courts should try them for their crimes. Some writers urged that an international court should try the terrorists, some urged use of the United States District Courts, while others urged use of military commissions. In the end, the President chose to authorize the creation of a military commission that may try some or all of the captured terrorists.
The President's decision has been both vehemently supported as a prudent move and vehemently denounced as an unconstitutional usurpation of individual rights. These voices are loud, but at this point are speculative. 
